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Quasi-Suspect Classes and Proof of
Discriminatory Intent: A New Model
Current equal protection law provides inadequate protection to
quasi-suspect classes' alleging that the burdens of a facially neutral
law fall on them with a disproportionate impact.2 Under the present
approach to analyzing disproportionate impact claims raised by either
a suspect or a quasi-suspect class, an equal protection violation is es-
tablished if the plaintiff shows not only that the disproportionate
impact in fact occurred, but also that it was imposed with a dis-
criminatory intent.3 This approach will be referred to as dispropor-
tionate impact analysis. Although the Supreme Court has expressed
a willingness to examine both direct and circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory intent,4 it has refused to rely on purely circumstantial
evidence.5
The intent requirement and the standards for satisfying it have
been developed in cases involving claims by suspect classes.6 That
1. Quasi-suspect classes are those subject to an intermediate level of review under
the equal protection clause. See pp. 915-16 infra.
2. Under the Court's present approach, if legislation actually employs a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification, heightened judicial scrutiny is automatically triggered. Brest,
Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative
Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95, 108-09. Because this Note focuses on the evidentiary ob-
stacles to invoking this heightened scrutiny for facially. neutral legislation, it does not
address current law on legislation that is facially discriminatory.
3. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-46 (1976). In Washington, two black ap-
plicants to the District of Columbia police force alleged that a test of verbal skills dis-
proportionately excluded blacks. They did not, however, allege that the test was utilized
with a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 235. The Court held that their claim did not
constitute a prima facie violation of the equal protection clause. Id. at 244-46. The same
analysis was applied to a quasi-suspect class in Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 273-74, 279 n.24 (1978). See p. 913 & note 7 infra (discussing Feeney).
4. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68
(1977).
5. In Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979), and Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979), the Court rejected the argument that discriminatory
intent could be inferred if a disproportionate impact was the natural and foreseeable
consequence of a decision. 443 U.S. at 464-65; 443 U.S. at 536 n.9. Both cases addressed
the segregative effect of a school board's practices. In certain specialized contexts, however,
the Court has been willing to accept circumstantial evidence as establishing intent. Cas-
taneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (permitting use of pure disproportionate impact
test to establish equal protection violation in specialized context of Texas keyman jury
system). The jury context may be unique because nondiscriminatory methods of random
selection are readily available.
6. All of the major cases enunciating the fundamental principles of disproportionate
impact analysis have addressed claims based on race. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
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analysis then has been applied unquestioningly by the Court to the alle-
gations of a quasi-suspect class.7 This Note argues that it is inappro-
priate automatically to extend to the claims of quasi-suspect classes
concepts that were designed to address the claims of suspect classes.
The Note proposes an alternative model for proving discriminatory
intent that addresses the special needs of quasi-suspect classes.
To illustrate the problems facing quasi-suspect classes under the
current paradigm, the Note also examines the claims of linguistic
minorities to an equal protection right to bilingual education.8 Be-
443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
7. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-74, 279 n.24 (1979). The Court did not
discuss why it required proof of intent in cases involving quasi-suspect classes, nor did
it explain why it invoked a standard of proof similar to that used in cases involving
suspect classes. The proof requirements established in Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977), were applied without dis-
cussion by the Court. 442 U.S. at 279 n.24.
8. Bilingual education refers to a broad spectrum of programs, ranging from assimila-
tive, English-as-a-second-language (ESL) programs to pluralistic bilingual-bicultural pro-
grams. Foster, Bilingual Education: An Educational and Legal Survey, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 149,
154-57 (1976). The considerable variety of programs may account in part for the schol-
arly disagreement on the pedagogical effectiveness of bilingual education. At least one
review of the existing research, however, has found that bilingual education improved,
or did not impede, oral language development, reading and writing abilities, mathematics
and social studies achievement, cognitive functioning, and self-image for non-English-speak-
ing students. L. ZAPPERT & B. CRUZ, BILINGUAL EDUCATION: AN APPRAISAL OF EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH 39 (1977) (ERIC No. ED 153-758). There is also empirical evidence that bi-
lingual education improves school attendance. Id. Unfortunately, a number of method-
ological defects impair the credibility of the major nationwide study on the effects of
bilingual education. INTERCULTURAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, THE AIR EVALUA-
TION OF THE IMPACT OF ESEA TITLE VII SPANISH/ENGLISH BILINGUAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS
2, 4, 5-6, 7-8, 9, 10-12, 14-16 (1977) (ERIC No. ED 151-435) (citing highly questionable
subjective methods of determining language proficiency, subjective methods of selecting
comparison groups and failure to identify such groups in all cases, failure to provide
adequate interim period between pre-test and post-test measures, improper use of reading
test, failure to control for differences in programs and amount of in-service training of
teachers).
This Note does not attempt to debate the merits of the various bilingual education
programs. It argues only that some minimal level of bilingual education is required by
the equal protection clause. See note 69 infra (equality of opportunity requires only
meaningful access). The precise nature of this program can be left to educators under
the supervision of the courts. If, however, a program were found to be ineffective, see,
e.g., Kobrick, A Model Act Providing for Transitional Bilingual Education Programs in
Public Schools, 9 HARV. J. LEGis. 260, 265-67 (1972) (ESL programs largely ineffective in
meeting needs of non-English-speaking children), it would certainly not satisfy the mandate
of the equal protection clause. The nature of the minimum program of bilingual education
needed to satisfy equal protection requirements may change over time as educators and
legislators become more aware of the efficacy of'various approaches. Because a num-
ber of recently enacted state statutes require periodic reports on the results of programs
initiated under the legislation, more information about the effects of bilingual education
programs will be available in the future. See CAL EDUC. CODE § 52177 (West 1978 & Supp.
1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-10.1-5.5-7 (Burns Supp. 1981); MICH. Comr. LAws ANN. § 380.1158
(Supp. 1980-1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-23-5 (Supp. 1980); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-54-16
(Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 115.996 (West Supp. 1980-1981).
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cause most linguistic minorities arguably qualify as quasi-suspect class-
es, the proposed model can be used to vindicate those claims.0
I. The Current Approach to Quasi-Suspect Classifications
The Supreme Court's decisions have left unclear the precise criteria
that determine quasi-suspect status. This ambiguity has prevented
lower courts from labeling all arguably deserving groups as quasi-
suspect classes. Linguistic minorities, for example, are particularly
worthy candidates for quasi-suspectness, yet they have not been ac-
9. Although provisions for bilingual education have been made by federal statute,
Bilingual Education Act of 1978, §§ 701-751, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3261 (Supp. III 1979), the
constitutional status of such congressional enactments is uncertain. In Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563 (1974), the Court pointed solely to a disproportionate impact in ruling that
a failure to provide bilingual instruction to non-English-speaking children violated Title
VI. Id. at 566-68. The Court relied heavily on a guideline, promulgated by the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), that required school districts to take
affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiencies of children of ethnic minorities when
these deficiencies kept such children from effectively participating in the educational
programs. Id. at 568-69.
In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), however, the holding in
Lau was called into question. Five members of the Court expressed the view that the
criteria for establishing a violation of Title VI were the same as those for establishing
a violation of the equal protection clause. Id. at 287. Justice Brennan, however, in an
opinion joined by three other Justices, pointed out that this holding was at odds with
the decision in Lau. Id. at 352.
Despite the Court's questioning of the Lau rationale, Congress passed section 204(f) of
the Equal Education Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1976). This Act pro-
vides that no state may deny an individual an equal educational opportunity because
the individual failed to overcome language barriers that impede participation in in-
structional programs. Although the Supreme Court has not decided whether, under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Act may constitutionally exceed the scope
of the equal protection clause, several courts have endorsed the view that it may. United
States v. Hinds County School Bd., 560 F.2d 619, 623-24 (5th Cir. 1977); Martin Luther
King Junior Elementary School Children v. Michigan Bd. of Educ., 463 F. Supp. 1027,
1031-32 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
The need to establish an equal protection right to bilingual education has become
especially pressing in light of recent indications that Congress may include an intent
requirement under civil rights provisions that were previously held to require only proof
of a disproportionate impact to establish a prima facie case, thereby making the scope
of these statutes coextensive with that of the equal protection clause. N.Y. Times, April
19, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 1. In addition, the Reagan administration recently decided to
reject proposed regulations requiring bilingual instruction in school districts with more
than twenty-five non-English-speaking students. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1981, § A, at 1,
col. 1. According to Secretary of Education T.H. Bell, the regulations were "harsh, in-
flexible, burdensome, unworkable, and incredibly costly." Id. Until the new administration
can formulate its own rules, guidelines established in 1975 will be followed, see note 83
infra; however, the administration clearly indicated a desire to cut back on the re-
sources devoted to such programs, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1981, § B, at 10, cols. 2-3. See also
Comment, The Legal Status of Bilingual Education in America's Public Schools: Testing
Ground for a Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation of Equal Protection, 17 DuQ.
L. REV. 473, 500-01 (1978-1979) (constitutional right to bilingual education would promote
greater judicial certainty and would not be subject to legislative repeal).
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corded this status. Their treatment will therefore be used to illus-
trate the failings of current equal protection law.
A. The Criteria for Determining Quasi-Suspect Status
Although race is the paradigmatic suspect classification, the equal
protection clause is not limited by its terms to protecting only racial
minorities.10 The Court has extended suspect status to classifications
based on national origin" and alienage' 2 in addition to those based
on race. These suspect classifications are subject to strict scrutiny:
they are disallowed unless necessary to promote a compelling state
interest." In addition, the Court has extended quasi-suspect, rather
than suspect, status to classifications based on gender'4 and illegit-
imacy.' 5 A quasi-suspect classification is subject to an intermediate
10. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DxsrgusT 148-49 (1980); Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976
Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV.
1, 22 (1977). But cf. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JuDIcIRY 23 (1977) (original intent of
Fourteenth Amendment framers was to constitutionalize specific protections for blacks of
Civil Rights Act of 1866). Berger suggests that the distinction between "citizen" and
"person" in section I of the Fourteenth Amendment was simply not carefully considered.
Id. at 215. Whatever the original intent of the framers may have been, the Court has
accepted the view that the word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment should include
groups other than blacks. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968) (illegitimates
are "persons" under equal protection clause).
11. E.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478-80 (1954); see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw 1012-19 (1978).
12. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); see L. TRIBE, supra note
11, at 1052-56. Beginning in 1978, however, the Court retreated from applying strict
scrutiny to claims by aliens and adopted a looser, rational relation test. See Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 72-75 (1979) (discussing Court's gradual withdrawal from according
aliens suspect status); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294-97 (1978) (inappropriate to
apply strict scrutiny to legislative classifications based on alienage when matters are
within state's constitutional prerogatives). Although the Court did not explain its new
position or overrule its prior decisions, the change may represent a sub rosa acknowl-
edgment that alienage is better addressed under federal preemption doctrine than under
equal protection law. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1060-65 (1979).
13. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
14. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S.
7, 13-14 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
15. The Court's treatment of illegitimacy has been inconsistent. In Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968), although the Court claimed to be using a rational relation test, id.
at 71, it subjected a classification based on illegitimacy to a heavier burden of justification.
Id.; see Perry, supra note 12, at 1056 n.165. In Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971),
the Court seemed to retreat from this position by upholding a Louisiana law that denied
unacknowledged illegitimates the right to inherit from a father who died intestate if
other designated relatives survived him, even though it felt that this policy was neither
a perfect nor a desirable solution and that more rational choices were available. Id. at
538-39; see Perry, supra note 12, at 1056 n.165. The decision in Labine was given little
weight, however, in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), when the Court invalidated
a law permitting illegitimates to inherit through intestate succession only from mothers.
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level of review: it may be employed only if substantially related to
an important state interest.16
In determining whether to accord suspect or quasi-suspect status to
a class, the Court must decide whether the classification is in some
relevant sense sufficiently "like race" to merit special judicial pro-
tection.'7 The Court has left largely unanswered, however, the ques-
tion of which criteria are relevant to that determination and how
much weight they should be given.' The clearest rule that can be
stated is that qualification for quasi-suspectness turns on whether a
class shares at least some of the indicia of suspectness. 19 This con-
The Court noted that the mere invocation of a proper state purpose was insufficient, id.
at 769, and that the statute must also be "carefully tuned to alternative considerations,"
id. at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 515 (1976)). Finally, in Lalli v. Lalli,
439 U.S. 259 (1978), the Court upheld an illegitimacy classification, but specifically stated
that a law using such a classification must be substantially related to permissible state
interests. Id. at 265. Despite this inconsistent treatment, recent commentators have con-
cluded that illegitimacy is a quasi-suspect classification. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 11,
at 1057; Karst, supra note 10, at 22-23.
16. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). An intermediate level of review may not,
however, be the neat unitary concept suggested by the formula in the text. Professor Tribe
has suggested five techniques for implementing an intermediate level of review. In con-
trast to strict scrutiny, the courts may (1) permit less substantial state interests, and (2)
approve a less precise fit between the law's means and ends. In contrast to the rational
relation test, the courts may (3) require a current articulation of the law's purpose, (4)
limit the ability of the state to invoke objectives as an afterthought, and (5) require that
the challenged legal scheme be altered to permit rebuttal in individual cases. L. TRIBE,
supra note 11, at 1082-89. In addition, Justice Marshall has argued that the level of
review in fact varies from case to case depending on the circumstances. Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471,519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
17. J. ELY, supra note 10, at 149.
18. Id. at 149-50 (courts and commentators have failed to elaborate theory of quasi-
suspectness); see Perry, supra note 12, at 1050-67 (illustrating inconsistent extension of
judicial protection to classifications other than race).
19. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1976) (past discrimination against
illegitimates justified quasi-suspect status, but was not severe or pervasive enough to merit
strict scrutiny); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973) (plurality opinion)
(past discrimination against women is one factor justifying strict scrutiny); L. TRIBE,
supra note 11, at 1012 (discreteness and insularity should be central criteria of suspectness
and quasi-suspectness); Perry, supra note 12, at 1050-51 (moral irrelevance of trait should
be main determinant of suspectness and quasi-suspectness).
The Court has not extended quasi-suspect status to classifications such as age or wealth.
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1976) (age discrimination
claim by policeman forced into retirement at age 50 subject to rational relation test);
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 55 (1973) (wealth dis-
crimination claim regarding school financing in Texas subject to rational relation test).
The reluctance of the Court to label age and wealth as quasi-suspect may be due to the
important ways in which they diverge from the paradigmatic suspect class of race. While
age is an imminent, inescapable attribute, it is also one that everyone has experienced
or can expect to experience. Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Dis-
crimination Act of 1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27, 32-34 (1979). Under a model of judicial review
predicated on a failure of the legislative process, see p. 917 infra, age discrimination
does not present a strong case for heightened scrutiny because a common characteristic of
legislative failure-a dichotomy between those enacting a law and those burdened by it
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fusion concerning what constitutes a quasi-suspect class may explain
the Court's consistent failure to label as quasi-suspect some groups
arguably deserving of that status.20
The Court has relied on three characteristics in ruling a class sus-
pect. First, the Court has examined whether the class has suffered a
history of discrimination.2 1 Although discrimination may occur in a
wide variety of areas, discrimination in the areas of voting and access
to the political process is of special importance because it may foster
the conditions of discreteness and insularity that characterize polit-
ically excluded minorities.2 2 According to this view, judicial inter-
vention is justified primarily to rectify failures in the legislative
process.
23
Second, the Court has looked to see if the class has been stigma-
tized by governmental action. 24 A group is unjustly stigmatized when
-is not present. It is also not necessarily stigmatizing to be treated differently because
of one's age. Schuck, supra, at 33-34.
With regard to wealth, most Americans feel that enough economic opportunity exists
to give each person the chance to achieve a satisfactory level of material well-being. J.
POLE, THE PURsuIr OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HIsToRY 334 (1978). The Court may there-
fore be reluctant to attribute a person's failure to occupy a higher economic and social
status to the state; this failure is more likely to be attributed to an individual's own past
mistakes, missed opportunities, and bad luck. Id. In addition, if the free market mechanism
is accepted as legitimate, wealth differentials seem inescapable. Cases raising an equal
protection claim based on wealth should therefore be heard under a fundamental inter-
ests doctrine because they depend not on whether the class is labeled suspect or quasi-
suspect, but on a general consensus that the commodity involved is so essential that a
minimum amount must be provided. Perry, supra note 12, at 1077-83.
20. This failure is serious because it deprives these groups of special judicial pro-
tection under the equal protection clause. See pp. 922-23 infra (discussing right of
quasi-suspect classes to heightened judicial review absent countervailing harms).
21. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973) (class based on wealth not suspect in part because not subject to history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment).
22. See id. at 28 (class based on wealth not suspect in part because it was not relegated
to position of political powerlessness); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971)
(aliens accorded suspect status because they were prime example of discrete and insular
minority entitled to heightened judicial solicitude). See generally United States v. Caro-
lene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (source of description of discrete and insular
minorities).
23. J. ELY, supra note 10, at 155-57. Professor Ely contends that legislative failure is
more likely to occur when the legislature allocates resources between a group perceived
as similar to itself and a group perceived as different from itself (a we-they dichotomy)
than when it chooses between two groups perceived as different from itself (a they-they
dichotomy). Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 933-34 n.85 (1973). Because legislators often perceive themselves as belonging to groups
different from discrete and insular minorities, the legislators often strike an inappropriate
balance between the interests of such groups and the claims of groups with which the
legislators identify more closely. J. ELY, supra note 10, at 158-60.
24. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361, 373-76 (1978) (dictum)
(plurality opinion) (any statute that stigmatizes is unconstitutional violation of equal
protection). Several commentators have noted the central importance of stigma in de-
The Yale Law Journal
the state treats an individual either as a member of an inferior caste
or as a nonparticipant in governmental processes. 25 Stigma not only
damages individuals psychologically, but also affects the way in which
they are treated by other members of society.26 Under this view, stigma
must be defined not only by the individual's subjective reactions,
but also by societal attitudes toward individuals with a particular
characteristic.
27
Third, the Court has asked whether the classification is based on
immutable -characteristics. 28 The principal reason for extending leg-
islative approval or disapproval is to influence individual choices and
activities. 29 Immutable characteristics by definition cannot be altered
by legislative disapproval; illicit motives are thus more likely to un-
derlie legislative use of such characteristics. The importance of im-
mutability as an indicium of suspectness should not, however, be over-
rated. First, some suspect classifications are not immutable.30 Second,
some immutable characteristics are accepted as legitimate classifica-
tions.31 Proponents of immutability as the major criterion of suspect-
ness have failed to explain how courts should distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate legislative classifications based on immu-
table characteristics. 2 Immutability therefore cannot serve as a touch-
stone of suspectness, even though it is not entirely irrelevant.
3 3
The precise degree to which a class must possess these character-
istics in order to be accorded quasi-suspect, rather than suspect, status
remains unclear. It seems probable, however, that if a group shares
all of them to some degree, it should qualify at least for protection
termining when to apply heightened judicial scrutiny. See Karst, supra note 10, at 23-24;
Karst & Horowitz, The Bakke Opinions and Equal Protection Doctrine, 14 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 7, 26 (1979); Perry, supra note 12, at 1050-51.
25. Karst, supra note 10, at 6.
26. Id. at 6-8.
27. See id. at 6 n.25 (stigma defined not by subjective reaction of individual but by
attitudes of others). But cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34
(1978) (Powell, J.) (stigma reflects standardless subjective judgment with no clearly defined
constitutional meaning).
28. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (sex
should be suspect classification in part because it is immutable characteristic).
29. J. ELY, supra note 10, at 154-55; Perry, supra note 12, at 1065-66. Perry concedes,
however, that some immutable characteristics are relevant legislative considerations. Id.
at 1065 n.220 (blindness relevant to opportunity to drive car).
30. J. ELY, supra note 10, at 150 (alienage).
31. Id. (physical disability and intelligence).
32. Id. Professor Ely claims that commentators have simply stated that immutable
characteristics constitute appropriate classifications when they are relevant to legitimate
purposes. Id. Such an assertion leaves very little independent justification for immuta-
bility theory. Id.
33. Id. at 155.
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as a quasi-suspect class.34 An additional factor that may influence the
Court's decision to label a class quasi-suspect is the presence of a sig-
nificant overlap between the class in question and other classes con-
sidered suspect. Although such overlap has been cited to support
heightened judicial scrutiny,3 5 it is probably not a central determi-
nant of quasi-suspect status. One group already labeled quasi-suspect
does not overlap significantly with suspect classes,36 and at least one
claim based solely on such overlap has failed.3 7
B. The Inadequacy of the Current Treatment
of Linguistic Minorities
Although linguistic minority groups probably do not qualify as sus-
pect classes,3 8 some share enough indicia of suspectness to constitute
a quasi-suspect class. First, some linguistic minorities have suffered a
history of discrimination. 9 Because much of this discrimination oc-
curred in the area of voting, these linguistic minorities may con-
34. The Court has been reluctant to extend strict scrutiny to new areas. Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAav. L. REv. 1, 12 (1972). In
keeping with this reluctance, it has been increasingly receptive to Justice Rehnquist's
suggestion that suspect status be limited to classifications based on race and national
origin. J. ELY, supra note 10, at 148-49; see Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 780-81
(1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Because only an intermediate level of review is applied
to the claims of quasi-suspect classes, the Court should not be as reluctant to extend
this status to other groups.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S. Ct. 1074 (1981), does
not undercut this conclusion. In Schweiker, the Court applied only a rational relation
test to the claims of mentally ill patients aged twenty-one to sixty-four in institutions
not receiving Medicaid funds who challenged legislation excluding them from eligibility
for certain Supplemental Security Income benefits. It reserved the issue of whether the
mentally ill should be treated as a quasi-suspect class because the statute "d[id] not
isolate the mentally ill or subject them, as a discrete group, to special and subordinate
treatment." Id. at 1081. By contrast, statutes that require English to be the sole language
of instruction burden only the non-English-speaking. Only they are deprived of instruc-
tion in their native language, and only they suffer the attendant adverse consequences
of this deprivation. See note 8 supra; note 78 infra.
35. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 513 (D.D.C. 1967), afl'd sub nom. Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (close judicial scrutiny of tracking system that
led to ability groupings segregated by race and socioeconomic status).
36. The class of women, though considered quasi-suspect, does not contain a higher
proportion of suspect groups than does a random sample of the population.
37. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548-49 (1972) (although percentage of re-
cipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) who were Negroes and
Mexican-Americans was higher than in other social welfare programs, provision of rela-
tively lower benefits to AFDC recipients was not subject to strict scrutiny).
38. The Court's reluctance to expand the scope of strict scrutiny leaves it unlikely
to accord suspect status to linguistic minorities. See note 34 supra.
39. See Leibowitz, English Literacy: Legal Sanction for Discrimination, 45 NoTRE DAME
LAW. 7, 25-46 (1969) (past discrimination against linguistic minorities in voting, educa-
tion, legal proceedings, and business regulation).
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stitute precisely the type of discrete and insular minority that has
traditionally been denied access to elective political processes for rem-
edying their problems.40 Second, there is considerable evidence that
certain linguistic minorities have been stigmatized by official rejection
of their native language and heritage. 4' For example, the failure to
provide adequate bilingual education has created language barriers
in the schools; these language problems promote a sense of inferiority
among those less facile in the English language. 42 Third, although
the inability to speak English is not absolutely immutable, linguistic
minorities may never be able to achieve the degree of fluency of
their English-speaking counterparts, especially if they are denied bi-
lingual instruction.43 Finally, linguistic minority groups may overlap
significantly with certain national origin groups considered to be sus-
pect classes.44 The Spanish-speaking population of the Southwest pro-
vides an excellent illustration of a large linguistic minority that ar-
guably satisfies these criteria.
45
40. Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 203, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(1) (1976); cf. Note, The
Constitutional Right of Bilingual Children to an Equal Educational Opportunity, 47 S.
CAL. L. RyV. 943, 984 (1974) (bilingual children do not have meaningful access to ma-
joritarian political process because they usually belong to ethnic minority groups that
have historically been denied positions in government and because children in general
lack autonomous political power).
41. Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual Education, 9
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 52, 55-56 (1974).
42. Id. at 56; cf. Ryan & Carranza, Evaluative Reactions of Adolescents Toward Speak-
ers of Standard English and Mexican American Accented English, 31 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCH. 855, 859-60 (1975) (negative stereotyping of Spanish-accented English); Ryan,
Carranza, & Moffie, Reactions Toward Varying Degrees of Accentedness in the Speech
of Spanish-English Bilinguals, 20 LANCUAGE & SPEECH 267, 271 (1977) (negative stereo-
typing increases with degree of accentedness).
43. See S. ERVIN-TRiPP, LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AND COMMUNICATIVE CHOICE 95, 107
(1973) (young children are adaptable and sensitive language learners, while adults may
not have readily available strategies for language acquisition).
44. See Grubb, supra note 41, at 84 (linguistic minorities share substantial overlap
with Chinese-Americans, Japanese-Americans, Mexican-Americans, and Puerto Ricans).
Claims based on wealth are clearly distinguishable from claims based on language.
Equalizing the ability of all persons to speak English is generally viewed as a necessary
and desirable concomitant of promoting an equal educational opportunity. See, e.g., Lau
v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974); Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1152-54
(10th Cir. 1974); Bilingual Education Act of 1978, § 702, 20 U.S.C. § 3222(a) (Supp.
III 1979). By contrast, equalizing the wealth of all individuals is generally viewed as
antithetical to equality of economic opportunity. The significance of a disproportionate
impact in the two contexts is therefore quite different. See note 19 supra.
45. A linguistic minority certainly would qualify as a quasi-suspect class if it met to
some degree all of the mentioned criteria of suspectness. For example, evidence suggests
that the Spanish-speaking people of the Southwest meet these criteria. They have suf-
fered a history of discrimination. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN
AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL STUDY, REPORT III: THE EXCLUDED STUDENT 13-20 (1972) (dis-
crimination against Spanish speakers in education) [hereinafter cited as REPORT III]; U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN
THE SOUTHWEST 66-74 (1970) (recounting discrimination against Spanish-speaking persons
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II. Current Disproportionate Impact Analysis: Inadequate
Protection for Quasi-Suspect Classes
Proof of discriminatory intent is a crucial element of a dispropor-
tionate impact claim. When evaluating such claims, the Court has re-
quired litigants from quasi-suspect classes to meet the same standards
for proving intent that it applies to suits by suspect groups. This re-
quirement obtains even though, if intent is found, only an inter-
mediate level of review will be applied, rather than strict scrutiny.
Extending these high standards of proof to the claims of quasi-sus-
pect groups unnecessarily deprives these groups of needed judicial
protection. For example, even if linguistic minorities were accorded
quasi-suspect status, their claims to bilingual education would not
receive adequate treatment under the Court's current approach.
A. The Current Approach to Disproportionate Impact Analysis
Under the current law, a showing of disproportionate impact alone
is insufficient to establish a violation of equal protection; the plain-
tiff also must show that the relevant governmental body acted with
discriminatory intent.46 The Court has created stringent standards for
proving intent when claims are brought by suspect classes, presum-
ably to avoid extensive judicial interference with legislative and ad-
ministrative actions.47 Intent cannot be found on the basis of cir-
cumstantial evidence alone; some direct evidence of discriminatory
intent must also be presented.
48
in police contacts and court proceedings) [hereinafter cited as JUsTICE IN THE SOUTHWEST].
A considerable amount of this discrimination has occurred in the area of voting. See, e.g.,
Castro v. State, 2 Cal. 3d 223, 229-31, 466 P.2d 244, 247-49, 85 Cal. Rptr. 20, 23-25 (1970).
Spanish speakers have also suffered the stigma associated with official rejection of their
native language by the public school system. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A Bmt
CHANCE TO LERN: BIUNGUAL BICULTURAL EDUCATION 146-47 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
BILINGUAL BICULTURAL EDUCATION]; REPORT III, supra, at 13-20. Although the inability
to speak English is not immutable, Spanish speakers who are deprived of bilingual
education may never become as fluent as native English speakers. Cf. T. CARTER, MEXICAN
AMERICANS IN SCHOOLS: A HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL NEGLECT 161 (1970) (adult Spanish
speakers find correct English pronunciation more difficult than young children). Finally,
the Spanish-speaking population overlaps significantly with national origin groups, such
as Mexican-Americans, that are considered suspect. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475, 477-80 (1953).
46. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242-45 (1976).
47. Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional
Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36, 68-69 (1977).
48. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979). In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), the Court enumerated sources of both
direct and circumstantial evidence that could be used to show intent. Id. at 266-68. Four
evidentiary sources in addition to the impact itself were described: (1) the historical back-
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In Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,49 the Court indicated that
the standards for proving intent developed in cases involving suspect
classes would also apply to claims by a quasi-suspect class.5" In par-
ticular, the Court ruled that evidence that a disproportionate impact
on a quasi-suspect class was the natural and foreseeable consequence
of a given action is insufficient to establish a discriminatory purpose.5 1
Instead, the plaintiffs were required to show that the legislature had
acted "because of" rather than "in spite of" a foreseeable dispropor-
tionate impact.52 Yet if this heavy burden had been met, the chal-
lenged act would have been subject only to an intermediate level
of review.53
A group that qualifies for suspect or quasi-suspect status is pre-
sumptively entitled to special judicial protection under the equal
protection clause. Absent serious countervailing harms, suspect and
quasi-suspect classes should be accorded some form of heightened ju-
dicial review of their claims.54 The use of high standards for proving
ground of the decision, especially if it revealed a series of purposefully discriminatory
actions; (2) the specific sequence of events preceding the challenged decision; (3) de-
partures from normal procedures or substantive criteria; and (4) the legislative or ad-
ministrative history of the decision, especially contemporaneous statements by officials,
minutes of meetings, reports, or testimony as to motivation. Id. at 267-68. The first three
sources of evidence are circumstantial, and the fourth is direct evidence.
49. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
50. Id. at 271-74. The plaintiffs in Feeney claimed that the legislature acted with
discriminatory intent because veterans' preference legislation had a foreseeably severe dis-
proportionate impact on women, a quasi-suspect class. Id. at 278.
51. Id. at 278-79. Nevertheless, such foreseeability is relevant evidence of discrimina-
tory intent. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979); Columbus
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979). On occasion, moreover, the Court
has been willing to accept evidence of a disproportionate impact alone as conclusive
proof of discriminatory intent when the impact is otherwise inexplicable, either because
of the blatancy of the disparity, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341-42 (1960) (re-
drawing of city line led to 28-sided figure that disenfranchised nearly all black voters);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (permits refused to all Chinese applicants
while granted to virtually all non-Chinese applicants), or because it occurs over a sub-
stantial period of time in the context of a selection procedure particularly susceptible
to abuse, Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-97 (1977) (accepting statistical evidence of
disproportionate impact as establishing prima facie case in context of keyman jury
system).
52. 442 U.S. at 279. The Court elaborated by explaining that for a statute to be
overturned, the legislature must have sought to keep women in a predefined and stereo-
typical place. Id.
53. See id. at 273.
54. Brest, supra note 2, at 107-09. The rationale for requiring special judicial pro-
tection of these groups depends, of course, on what criteria are accepted as the crucial
indicia of suspectness. See pp. 916-18 supra. Professor Ely, for example, would argue
that such groups deserve heightened solicitude because they are likely to be losers in
the political process. J. ELY, supra note 10, at 159-60. Professor Karst, on the other hand,
would argue that special protection is necessary because such groups have been unjustly
stigmatized by governmental action. Karst, supra note 10, at 6. Yet whatever the reason
for requiring heightened scrutiny of legislation affecting these groups, the result is the
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intent deprives suspect and quasi-suspect classes of access to heightened
judicial review in a broad range of situations in which convincing
direct evidence of intent is unavailable.55 Because facially neutral leg-
islation often serves as a pretext for discrimination,"6 many acts of
legislative discrimination may never be subject to heightened judi-
cial scrutiny.57
When addressing claims of suspect classes, the Court must employ
high standards for proving intent to prevent three types of harm that
accompany the excessive invocation of strict scrutiny. First, because
strict scrutiny almost always leads to invalidation of the law under
review,5s its frequent use would be too disruptive.59 Second, exces-
sive judicial interference with legislative action might be perceived
as unauthorized and countermajoritarian. 60 Third, a low standard of
proof, when coupled with strict scrutiny, would foster greater con-
sciousness of suspect classifications by requiring the legislature to act
with greater cognizance of the impact of legislation on such classes.
61
For example, threatening to scrutinize legislation strictly if the state
does not avoid racially disproportionate impacts would force it to act
with race in mind and thus might promote racial consciousness.
62
same: a heightened level of review is mandated unless significant countervailing harms
prevent its use. If the courts could exercise their discretion to deny heightened review
in the absence of significant countervailing harms, they would cease to function ade-
quately, in Ely's view, as a check on the legislative process or, in Karst's view, as safe-
guards against the unjustifiable imposition of stigma.
55. Direct evidence is often nonexistent when officials, because of the routine nature
of their practices, need not explain their actions. Note, The Role of Circumstantial
Evidence in Proving Discriminatory Intent: Developments Since Washington v. Davis, 19
B.C. L. Rrv. 795, 799 (1978). Even available evidence may be unreliable when the alleged
violations occur over an extended period of time or involve a large number of officials. Id.
56. Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA.
L. Rav. 540, 551-53 (1977); see, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960)
(facially neutral redistricting legislation designed to disenfranchise blacks); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (facially neutral ordinance requiring permits to op-
erate laundries in wooden buildings administered in discriminatory manner against Chi-
nese); Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255-56 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546)
(facially neutral ordinance requiring every male prisoner to have hair clipped designed
to discriminate against Chinese).
57. In many situations, direct evidence of intent is lacking not because there was no
discriminatory purpose but because that purpose was obscured. See note 55 supra (cir-
cumstances in which direct evidence of intent is unavailable). Those burdened by inten-
tionally discriminatory but facially neutral legislation are arguably no less deserving of
protection than those burdened by legislation that is more overtly discriminatory.
58. Gunther, supra note 34, at 8 (strict scrutiny is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").
59. Eisenberg, supra note 47, at 68-69.
60. Because a court is not as politically accountable as the legislature, it may be
perceived as countermajoritarian. See A. BicKat, THE L.Asr DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23
(1962).
61. Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory
Purposes in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. Im. L.F. 961, 995.
62. Id.
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These harms are less imminent when the claims of quasi-suspect
classes arise because only an intermediate level of review, not strict
scrutiny, is applied. Many more laws can withstand an intermediate
level of review than can pass muster under strict scrutiny.63 The
frequent use of intermediate review thus would not lead to wide-
spread invalidation of laws. Disruption of governmental processes
would be avoided, and the judiciary would be less susceptible to charges
of illegitimate countermajoritarianism. 4 Similarly, the relative ease
with which legislators can tailor statutes to bear a fair and substan-
tial relation to an important state interest-the relationship needed
to survive intermediate review-makes it less likely than under strict
scrutiny that consciousness of disfavored classifications would increase.
Because these countervailing harms are less likely to occur when the
claims are those of quasi-suspect classes rather than suspect classes,
the Court would be justified in employing a lower standard for prov-
ing intent in the quasi-suspect context.65
The decision to evaluate allegations of discriminatory intent raised
by quasi-suspect classes under the same proof requirements developed
for claims of suspect classes reveals a marked insensitivity to the spe-
cial needs of the former. The equal protection concept of intent is
not uniform. In cases involving racial discrimination, "intent" gen-
erally refers to animus on the part of the relevant governmental body.6
By contrast, in gender discrimination cases, which are addressed to
the claims of a quasi-suspect class, the Court has premised its equal
protection decisions on findings that the legislature acted on the basis
of archaic stereotypes regarding the roles of men and women. 7 Un-
der this approach, the focus is less on animus than on the invocation
63. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275-76 (1978) (applying intermediate review
to uphold law that allows illegitimate child to inherit from intestate father only if court
had entered order declaring paternity); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977)
(upholding law that requires different computation of social security benefits for men
and women under intermediate level of review).
64. A. BicKEL, supra note 60, at 92-93, 128 (excessive judicial intervention is incom-
patible with principles of democratic theory and therefore must be limited).
65. Professor Brest has argued that. because of heavy institutional costs of rectifying
disproportionate impacts, the state should be required to eliminate only those impacts
attributable to past discrimination. Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword:
In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 36 (1976). A model
that retains an intent requirement meets this cost-benefit criterion. Professor Perry has
gone further by arguing that the benefits of a pure disproportionate racial impact test
coupled with an intermediate standard of review outweigh the costs. Perry, supra note
56, at 558-60. If Perry's view is supportable, then certainly one can assert that the benefits
of a more modest approach that retains the intent requirement outweigh the costs.
66. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 (1979).
67. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (plurality opinion).
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of mistaken assumptions about the characteristics of a quasi-suspect
class. 6s Because invidious discrimination based on outmoded stereo-
types may manifest itself in subtler ways than discrimination based
on animus, quasi-suspect classes may require more flexible standards
for establishing a prima facie case in order to obtain review of their
claims.69
68. E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976). By contrast, the Court, in Per-
sonnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), seemed to require something closer to animus
in a gender discrimination case. The Court required the plaintiffs to show that the leg-
islature acted "because of" rather than "in spite of" a disproportionate impact on women.
Id. at 279. The legislature must have sought to keep women in "a stereotypic and pre-
defined place," id., instead of simply accepting the validity of such stereotypes unques-
tioningly. The Court, however, did not explicitly recognize this shift in the definition
of intent. See Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assessment
After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1376, 1397-99 (1979) (discriminatory purpose involves
different forms of invidious discrimination; Feeney's failure to recognize this creates un-
justifiably constrictive limitation on equal protection clause).
In conjunction with this shift, the Court also required that the plaintiffs provide some
direct evidence of intent. Id. at 278-79. In applying this standard of proof in gender
discrimination cases, the Court failed to recognize that in most such cases, "instances of
first-degree prejudice are obviously rare." J. ELY, supra note 10, at 164. When "habit,
rather than analysis," Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
motivates state action that discriminates on the basis of sex, direct evidence of the type
referred to in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 267-68 (1977), may be unavailable. Instead, the vice is likely to be unthinking, and
hence undiscussed, reliance on outmoded assumptions about women.
69. It may seem inequitable, however, to allow quasi-suspect but not suspect classes
to use lowered proof requirements. To avoid this inequity, suspect classes could be given
the opportunity to establish a prima facie case by meeting a lower burden of proof;
however, their claims would then be subject to only an intermediate level of review. If
the suspect class could meet the Court's current requirements for proving intent, its
claim would continue to be subjected to strict scrutiny. This approach could provide a
useful supplement, especially as potential defendants become more sophisticated and use
subtler forms of discrimination, even with regard to suspect classes.
Although the standards for proving intent should be lowered, some proof of intent will
probably continue to be required. An intent requirement accords with equal protection
doctrine's traditional philosophical underpinnings, whether the plaintiff class be suspect
or quasi-suspect. The courts generally regard the state's equal protection obligation to
entail providing equality of opportunity and not equality of result. See Brest, supra note
65, at 5-6, 49-50 (antidiscrimination principle embodies equal treatment norm). See gen-
erally J. POLE, supra note 19, at 257-75 (history of American commitment to equality of
opportunity). Equality of treatment does not require that the state achieve distributive
justice among various groups, but only that it refrain from invidiously discriminating
against suspect or quasi-suspect groups. Brest, supra note 65, at 6, 48-49, 52; cf. Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 J. PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 107, 165-68 (1976)
(equal protection clause may plausibly be construed to prohibit state action harming
disadvantaged group, except when such action is necessary to promote compelling benefit
to polity). If disproportionate impact alone were sufficient to establish an equal protec-
tion violation, the state would be required to investigate the effects of its legislation on
various groups, even in the absence of an intention to discriminate invidiously. It would
thus be required to pursue equality of result rather than equality of opportunity. This
shift in focus might lead to excessive judicial interference in existing governmental prac-
tices and to accusations that the courts had usurped the role of the legislature. See p.
923 supra (excessive judicial action perceived as countermajoritarian). Requiring the state
to avoid disproportionate impacts on suspect and quasi-suspect classes would also heighten
its awareness of those classes. Schwemm, supra note 61, at 995.
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B. The Claims of Linguistic Minorities to
Bilingual Education: An Illustration
Even if linguistic minorities were to be accorded quasi-suspect status,
the Court's current approach to disproportionate impact analysis would
nevertheless frustrate adequate judicial protection of some of their
claims. For example, bilingual education cases typify the circumstances
in which the unavailability of direct evidence of intent blocks access
to more stringent review.70 Laws requiring English to be the sole
language of instruction often have been on the books for a number
of years; reenactment of such legislation may be routine, and in any
event, large numbers of individuals may be involved in the legisla-
tive process. 7 ' Direct evidence of intent consequently is either un-
available or unreliable.72 Moreover, discrimination against linguistic
minorities in the area of bilingual education may sometimes be of
a subtle variety. For example, the enactment of statutes making Eng-
lish the sole language of instruction in the schools may sometimes
have been predicated on stereotypical views of linguistic minorities
associated with assimilationism or Americanization. 73 Under these cir-
70. In addition to the theoretical reasons, there are practical reasons for examining
the claims of linguistic minorities to bilingual education. A substantial number of people
in the United States have difficulty speaking, reading, writing, and understanding English.
Cf. Grubb, supra note 41, at 53 (over 5,000,000 school-age children are from non-English-
speaking homes, but only 112,000 (2.2%) are in bilingual education programs). There is
also strong evidence that non-English-speaking students have significantly higher dropout
rates and lower achievement levels than English-speaking students when instruction is
exclusively in English. I T. ANDERSSON & M. BOYER, BILINGUAL SCHOOLING IN THE UNITED
STATES 43 (1970); T. CARTER, supra note 45, at 16-32; BILINGUAL BICULTURAL EDUCATION,
supra note 45, at 14-19; Cf. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN AMERICAN EDUCA-
TIONAL SERIES, REPORT II: THE UNFINISHED EDUCATION 8-38 (1971) (significantly higher
dropout rates and lower achievement for Mexican-American students in five Southwestern
states).
71. See Leibowitz, supra note 39, at 41-43 (describing enactment of statutes that require
English to be exclusive language of instruction).
72. See note 55 supra (describing situations in which direct evidence of intent is un-
likely to be available).
73. One observer has suggested that some statements of assimilative motivation should
be taken as probative evidence of discriminatory intent. Comment, Cultural Pluralism,
13 HAiv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 162 (1978). The author argues that in certain contexts,
such as a heated battle over integration in which an official refuses to provide bicultural
education out of assimilative motivation, his remarks may constitute a statement of intent.
Id. See generally Leibowitz, supra note 39, at 41-43 (statutes requiring English to be ex-
clusive language of instruction in schools were passed during period of nativism).
Evidence of widespread discrimination may also help establish the social meaning of
a legislative act. See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421, 424-27 (1960) (stigmatic effect of segregation in Southern subculture premised on
white supremacy). If social context were deemed relevant, a considerable body of evidence
showing generalized discrimination against linguistic minorities would be available. See
JUSTICE IN THE SOUTHWEST, supra note 45, at 66-74 (documenting discrimination against
Spanish-speaking persons in police contacts and court proceedings); U.S. COMM'N ON
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cumstances, the claims of linguistic minorities, even if raised as those
of quasi-suspect classes, would be unnecessarily foreclosed from an in-
termediate level of review under the current approach.
III. A New Model of Disproportionate Impact Analysis
and Its Application to Bilingual Education
A new model of disproportionate impact analysis is necessary to
afford adequate protection to the interests of quasi-suspect classes.
Under such a model, a member of a quasi-suspect class would be able
to establish discriminatory intent even when direct evidence of intent
was unavailable. Safeguards would be necessary, however, to prevent
the virtual elimination of the intent requirement. Under such a model,
some linguistic minorities could establish an equal protection right
to bilingual education.
A. The Model
This Note proposes that once members of a quasi-suspect class
claim and prove a disproportionate impact, they should be able to
establish a prima facie equal protection violation by adducing only
circumstantial evidence of intent. Such circumstantial evidence could
include the disproportionate impact itself, but courts should not re-
gard proof of that impact as a sufficient showing; permitting evi-
dence of disproportionate impact alone to establish intent would vi-
tiate the intent requirement.
A claimant could meet this burden by introducing evidence that
the impact was severe and that it persisted uniformly over a period
of time.74 Evidence of a pattern of facially neutral acts that foresee-
ably resulted in a discriminatory impact could also provide circum-
stantial evidence of intent.7 5 The consistency, severity, and foresee-
ability of the impact would all increase the likelihood that the
legislature in fact recognized and intended it. Once the plaintiff made
a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent, the burden would
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS: 1979, at 33 (1980) (discrimination against lin-
guistic minorities in voting); Leibowitz, supra note 39, at 25-41 (documenting historical
discrimination against non-English-speaking in voting, regulation of business activities,
and legal proceedings).
74. Note, supra note 55, at 797-99. Although the proposed test would require only
circumstantial evidence of intent, the plaintiffs could introduce whatever direct evidence
was available to strengthen their case. Direct evidence of intent includes public statements,
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shift to the defendant to demonstrate either that it acted without dis-
criminatory intent or that the law bore a fair and substantial relation
to an important purpose.
7 6
Adopting a purely circumstantial test of intent in this context would
not covertly eliminate the intent requirement. First, evidence of
intent in addition to the disproportionate impact itself would be re-
quired. The plaintiffs would have to prove that the relevant gov-
ernmental body took action that perpetuated a disproportionate im-
pact despite a recognition that the impact was significant and had
persisted for a considerable period of time. More important, the de-
fendant would have a realistic opportunity to rebut the prima facie
showing. Even if the state could not establish the absence of dis-
criminatory intent directly, an intermediate level of review would
provide it with an opportunity to rebut the showing of intent by
demonstrating that the law was well-designed to serve other ends.
77
76. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 275 (1979) (fact that dispro-
portionate impact not plausibly explained on neutral grounds under intermediate level
of review signals that real classification made by law was not neutral). Under the Court's
decision in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977), the defendant may show that discriminatory purpose was not a but-for cause of
the decision rather than showing an absence of discriminatory intent. Id. at 270 n.21. If
the plaintiff in Arlington Heights had met the high standard of proof established by
the Court and had shown discriminatory intent, the defendant probably would not have
been able to rebut this evidence by showing an absence of discriminatory intent. The
defendant also generally would be unable to satisfy the demanding test of strict scrutiny.
The Court may therefore have used the concept of but-for causation to provide the de-
fendant with a realistic opportunity to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case. Arguably,
the Court is attempting to strike a balance between the need for heightened judicial
review and the need to avoid the disutility and futility associated with the invalidation
of laws that would have been passed absent any discriminatory purpose. Comment, Proof
of Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v.
Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv.
725, 752 (1977). Neither strict scrutiny nor rational relation review can strike an appro-
priate balance; the Court therefore resorted to the device of examining whether the
discriminatory purpose was "strictly harmless" because the same decision would have
resulted in its absence. Id. Because the proposed model applies only an intermediate level
of review and because the plaintiff's burden of proof is lower, there is no need to resort
to this but-for causation device to allow the defendant to rebut the showing of discrim-
inatory intent. The proposed model therefore does not utilize such a concept.
77. See Perry, supra note 56, at 559-60. Professor Simon has suggested that this op-
portunity to rebut may support an intent requirement. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Gov-
ernmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Dis-
crimination, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1041, 1121-22, 1127 (1978). According to Simon, proof
of a disproportionate impact coupled with evidence that the action's claimed goal could
reasonably have been promoted by means producing less disadvantage to the plaintiff
class should support an inference of discriminatory intent. Id. at 1121. The government
may rebut this showing by demonstrating the unreliability of the plaintiff's data, or
the significant goal frustration or added costs that the alleged alternative would entail. Id.
at 1127. Professor Perry has criticized this view and argued that the basic function of
heightened review is to assure that laws with such costs are justified by sufficiently
weighty considerations, whether or not they are motivated by racial prejudice. Perry,
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Although the burden of proof on the intent issue thus would be shifted
in part to the state, intent would remain a significant component of
equal protection violations.
B. Bilingual Education: A Possible Application
Under the proposed model, plaintiffs could successfully establish
an equal protection right to bilingual education in certain circum-
stances. They might first show that at the time of enactment or re-
enactment of statutes requiring English to be the sole language of
instruction, statistical evidence indicated high dropout rates and low
achievement for non-English-speaking children in schools in which
English was the only language used.78 They might also demonstrate
A Brief Comment on Motivation and Impact, 15 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1173, 1182-83 (1978).
Significantly, Simon would hold that a disproportionate impact resulting from the state's
failure to inquire into the availability of reasonable alternatives, especially when a gov-
ernment agency must continually assess goals, means, and demographic data, constitutes a
prima facie violation of equal protection. Simon, supra, at 1125. The proposed model,
however, does not base violations of equal protection on disproportionate impact alone
because it retains an intent requirement in evaluating original enactment and subsequent
reenactments of challenged legislation.
78. Widespread concern about evidence of the adverse consequences of failing to pro-
vide bilingual education to linguistic minorities was voiced from the mid-1960s to early
1970s. See, e.g., Bilingual Education: Hearings on S. 428 Before the Special Subcomm. on
Bilingual Education of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 51-55 (1967) (statement of A. Bruce Gaarder). The federal government made specific
provisions for bilingual education as early as 1968. Bilingual Education Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-247, §§ 701-706, 81 Stat. 816 (current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3223 (Supp.
III 1979)). Despite this concern and the evidence supporting it, eleven states in the 1960s
and 1970s reenacted, recodified, or retained after amendment of another portion of the
statute, provisions making English the exclusive language of instruction. See COLO. REv.
STAT. § 123-21-3 (1963) (current version at COLO. REv. STAT. § 22-1-103 (1973)) (recodified
and reenacted 1963); 1963 Idaho Sess. Laws 116 (current version at IDAHO CODE § 33-1601
(Supp. 1980)) (enacted); 1961 111. Laws 31 (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 27-2
(Smith-Hurd 1961)) (reenacted); 1974 Iowa Acts 531 (current version at IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 280.4 (West Supp. 1980-1981)) (enacted); 1965 Mass. Acts 340, 1967 Mass. Acts 778 (current
version at Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, § I (West 1978)) (amended); 1961 Minn. Laws
1018, 1967 Minn. Laws 162, 1969 Minn. Laws 262, 1974 Minn. Laws 544, 1975 Minn. Laws
462 (current version at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.10 (West Supp. 1980)) (amended); 1969
N.C. Sess. Laws 404, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 284, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 42 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 115-198 (1978)) (reenacted and amended); OR. REv. STAT. § 336.078 (1967-
1968) (recodified 1968) (repealed 1971); 1961 Pa. Laws 841 (current version at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327 (Purdon Supp. 1980-1981)) (amended); 1971 S.D. Sess. Laws 120,
1975 S.D. Sess. Laws 213 (codified at S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 13-33-11 (1975)) (amended);
1963 Wis. Laws 41, 1963 Wis. Laws 566 (codified at Wis. STAT. § 40.46 (West 1966))
(amended). If, in spite of the generally recognized need for bilingual education, these
legislatures reenacted such statutes, the plaintiffs could argue that these actions demon-
strate a discriminatory intent. See pp. 930-31 infra (bilingual education claims meet Feeney
test of intent).
Nine of the states mentioned have since made explicit provisions for bilingual edu-
cation. 1975 Colo. Sess. Laws 666 (current version at CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 22-24-101 to -119
(Supp. 1980)); 1980 Idaho Sess. Laws 305 (codified at IDAHO CODE § 33-1601 (Supp. 1980));
1973 Ill. Laws 2184 (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 14C-1 to -12 (Smith.
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that there was empirical evidence that bilingual education had posi-
tive effects for such children.79 The high dropout rates would indi-
cate that any assimilative purpose of the legislation was not being
served. The data on achievement and the evidence on the positive
effects of bilingual education would also show that such an approach
did not promote equal educational opportunity.8 0 Based on this evi-
dence, the court then could reasonably conclude, prima facie, that
Hurd Supp. 1980-1981)); 1979 Iowa Acts 87 (codified at IowA CODE ANN. § 280A (West
Supp. 1980-1981)); 1971 Mass. Acts 296, 1971 Mass. Acts 943 (current version at MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 76, § 1, ch. 71A, §§ 1-9 (West 1978 8- Supp. 1981)); 1977 Minn. Laws 594,
1980 Minn. Laws 1339 (current version at MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 120.10, 126.36, .261-.269
(West Supp. 1981)); 1971 Or. Laws 487 (codified at OR. REv. STAT. §§ 336.074, .079 (1979-
1980)); 1968 Pa. Laws 1020 (current version at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1511 (Purdon
Supp. 1980-1981)); 1975 Wis. Laws 1256 (current version at Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 115.95-
.996, 118.01 (West Supp. 1980-1981)). In two states, however, the laws remain on the books;
these could be challenged under the proposed model. Even if states have since voluntarily
enacted statutes permitting bilingual education, the analysis in this Note remains im-
portant because it would render the provision of bilingual education mandatory and
might also require a demonstration that the bilingual programs were successful in achiev-
ing at least minimal proficiency in English.
79. See note 8 supra.
80. This view underlies passage of the Bilingual Education Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-561, §§ 701-751, 92 Stat. 2268 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3222-3261 (Supp. III 1979)),
which specifically states that bilingual programs are necessary to ensure an equal educa-
tional opportunity. Id. § 702 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3222(a)). Courts on numerous oc-
casions have found that failure to provide bilingual education has deprived non-English-
speaking children of an equal educational opportunity. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563,
566-68 (1974); Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1149-50, 1153 (10th Cir.
1974), aff'g 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972). One court, however, has rejected a claim
based on such data because it felt that, the variations were due to differences in socio-
economic status rather than the failure to provide bilingual education. Otero v. Mesa
County Valley School Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162, 165 (D. Colo. 1975), vacated on
other grounds, 568 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1977). The court also noted in dictum that there
is no constitutional right to bilingual-bicultural education. Id. at 170. Because the court
held that the school district had already taken all necessary steps to remedy the language
deficiencies of non-English-speaking students, id. at 176, the case does not rule out the
possibility of an equal protection right to some minimum level of bilingual education.
A federal district court recently found that Texas' failure to provide bilingual educa-
tion to Mexican-American students violated the equal protection clause. United States
v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tex. 1981). The court pointed to three distinct forms
of deliberate past discrimination against Mexican-American children. First, they had
been restricted on the basis of ancestry to so-called "Mexican schools." Second, they were
provided with vastly inferior educational resources. Third, in an effort to "Americanize"
these Mexican-American children, their native language and culture were assailed and
excluded. Id. at 414. The court concluded that "in the context of this concerted program
of discrimination . . .. the policy of using English exclusively in the Texas public
schools must be seen, not as neutral or benign, but rather as one more vehicle to main-
tain these children in an inferior position." Id. The systematic nature of the violation,
moreover, constituted proof that the current language-based learning problems of Mexican-
American children were caused in part by the state's prior unlawful actions. Id. at 416.
The court further noted that "bilingual instruction [with the exception of ESL programs
found to be inadequate] is uniquely suited .. . for compensating . . . for learning dif-
ficulties engendered by pervasive discrimination." Id. at 420. This approach is somewhat
similar to the proposal advocated here, although the Texas case addressed the claims of
a suspect rather than a quasi-suspect class.
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the legislators had acted with discriminatory intent., If the statutes
furthered no articulated legislative purpose,8 2 the state would be hard-
pressed to rebut the plaintiff's showing. In the absence of such a re-
buttal by the state, the plaintiffs would succeed in asserting an equal
protection right to bilingual education.s3
Conclusion
A new model of disproportionate impact analysis should be adopted
for addressing the claims of quasi-suspect classes. The proposed model
would adequately protect traditionally disadvantaged groups without
leading to excessive disruption of governmental programs, accusations
that the judiciary has exceeded its authority, or unduly heightened
awareness of quasi-suspect classes. The utility of the proposed mod-
el is illustrated by the likelihood that it would increase judicial sen-
sitivity to the possible right of linguistic minorities to bilingual
education.
81. The situation described in the text could therefore easily meet even the new defini-
tion of intent in Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). See pp. 924-25 supra (us-
ing definition of intent framed largely in terms of animus for claim by quasi-suspect class).
In Feeney, the Court held that the state had a legitimate interest in extending preferences
to veterans, both male and female. To accomplish this articulated goal, the legislature
was required to pass a statute that had a disproportionate impact on women. Because
there was no other way to achieve a legitimate legislative purpose, the statute was passed
in spite of this impact rather than because of it. But see Note, supra note 68, at 1409-11
(if Court in Feeney had balanced disproportionate impact of law against legitimate in-
terests it served, it might have found that legislature acted with discriminatory purpose).
By contrast, a legislature could not argue that despite the disproportionate impact, its
failure to provide bilingual education was necessary to promote the mastery of English
because a large body of evidence refutes this proposition.
82. The only remaining legislative justification is the administrative convenience of
teaching only in English. The courts, however, have often rejected administrative con-
venience as a justification for laws that perpetuate archaic stereotypes. See Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (plurality opinion); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
76-77 (1971). If administrative convenience is insufficient to justify an unthinking re-
liance on outmoded sexual stereotypes, it certainly cannot justify the intentional use of
classifications to perpetuate such stereotypes.
83. Even if the proposed model did on occasion require providing assistance to a
small number of non-English-speaking students, there is evidence that such a result
would be workable. Although the HEW Task Force specified that Title VI would apply
only to school districts with twenty or more students who spoke a primary language
other than English, it explicitly recognized the school district's obligation to serve any
student whose primary language was other than English. HEW Task Force Findings
Specifying Remedies Available for Eliminating Past Educational Practices Ruled Un-
lawful Under Lau v. Nichols 4 (Aug. 11, 1975), reprinted in CENTER FOR LAW AND EDU-
CATION, BILINGUAL-BICULTUR&L EDUCATION 228 (1975). The limited application of Title
VI was necessary only during the initial stage of investigation due to limited staff. Id.
After this initial stage, HEW presumably would recognize a broader obligation to non-
English-speaking students. Id. These findings answer the concern voiced by several courts,
see, e.g., Otero v. Mesa County Valley Dist. No. 51, 408 F. Supp. 162, 169 (D. Colo. 1975),
vacated on other grounds, 568 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1977); Morales v. Shannon, 366 F. Supp.
813, 822 (W.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 516 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1975),
that an equal protection right to bilingual education would result in administrative chaos.
